-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Advisory ID: SYSS-2014-013 Product(s): FAMOC Vendor: FancyFon Affected Version(s): 3.16.5 Tested Version(s): 3.16.5 Vulnerability Type: Use of a One-Way Hash without a Salt (CWE-759) Risk Level: Low Solution Status: Fixed Vendor Notification: 2014-12-19 Solution Date: 2015-01-23 Public Disclosure: 2015-01-23 CVE Reference: CVE-2015-3399 Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg (SySS GmbH) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: FAMOC is a mobile device management software by FancyFon supporting different kinds of mobile devices. The vendor FancyFon describes the product as follows (see [1]): "FAMOC is a flexible and open mobile device lifecycle management solution, enabling any number of smartphones using a variety of operating systems, to be centrally and remotely managed, over the Internet." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The SySS GmbH found out that user passwords are stored as raw, unsalted MD5 hash values in the table tb_user of the database of the FAMOC mobile device management software. The use of a cryptographic one-way hash function MD5 without using a salt for storing sensitive data like user passwords allows an attacker with access to this data to perform efficient password guessing attacks using pre-computed dictionaries, for instance rainbow tables. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): By having access to the database of the FAMOC mobile device management software, for example by exploiting an SQL injection vulnerability, an attacker can extract hashed user passwords from the table tb_user, as the following sqlmap output illustrates: sql-shell> select pass from tb_user where login='syss' [10:25:57] [INFO] fetching SQL SELECT statement query output: 'select pass from tb_user where login='syss'' [10:25:57] [INFO] retrieved: 1 [10:26:01] [INFO] retrieving the length of query output [10:26:01] [INFO] retrieved: 32 [10:26:50] [INFO] retrieved: 3c7bdf8ab364c1ef5c951d1cc5d7239d select pass from tb_user where login='syss' [1]: [*] 3c7bdf8ab364c1ef5c951d1cc5d7239d The stored user passwords are raw MD5 hashes, as the following output for the sample password "syss" shows: $ echo -n "syss" | md5sum 3c7bdf8ab364c1ef5c951d1cc5d7239d - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: Update to FAMOC software version 3.17.4. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2014-12-19: Vulnerability reported to vendor 2014-12-19: Vendor acknowledges e-mail with SySS security advisory 2015-01-16: Contacted vendor for status information about the reported vulnerability 2015-01-23: Vendor responds that this security vulnerability was addressed in the FAMOC software version 3.17.4. Public release of security advisory 2015-04-29: Update of security advisory with assigned CVE ID ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] Product Web Site for FAMOC Mobile Device Management http://www.fancyfon.com/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of the SySS GmbH. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc Key fingerprint = 5AE3 96EE A014 FB90 9D81 AF90 8C54 7E88 A34C CED8 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS Web site. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJVQITYAAoJENmkv2o0rU2riaIP/ArYly8BDXKc28BmsClXotkH 8RJK6a3fhU4ojslvsH7g/tzJkDsE4mSv9af3lY/yMBlGxvxkZELO7zEpX8vFAqvu Aug8phfPkayvmQN/OCXN48cnLF1XgWYB7HFTSOTe9qoHyULknN+hmPWFOlVv2vDw oXgRse9TLiNC+QE6a/2A03BWuPxviUV8pAKaYZmNkB/KfJ8BBn9H7oSItDd68UBQ odZMRd6TeooFf3wLJ3m2/ARKeRLQArAX3cWwBo4m7TRElxxj4MdhGnYE47wWoy90 RXHCioZgkJubfDIK65wtTriQGeH+YnUT5eLyyhnIXLnwr6jtXMH4XzU1Q7R9euLc GL0YGvVyfb8+MlUmToSqNhPqtB9jkOEkPER1vdagfa+3XzEM78d7XXb108lyh5le f/YhYtt6kXZJ4Gq6TIG1RpyrvfZ08IyToO7osBiip0X8Vetb5W5hdG6o5Wy8y09S TTP1/wvPP32lT6mJohhftEQ9lr1v6ZF7dQA/dA8X6P7Cpw4RdV5bzMs5QQxUesaz prxePFSc9TG4iWQsrNlH9tYsE2q7sWtE4wTuZ7ZJg2EpVVFEpS99gH85qYX/ZBn4 z/my4L52P53OFJ2RShtYBejtfVtnREPLdPptGQjXUY0/51ikqx8O77ISMAsDq3uc VrEQaQEASoidbvvLgYKF =Izpg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----